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United States—Chile Bilateral Free
Trade Act
by Jake Berlin

Introduction

Since the formation of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 1947,
world trade has increased exponentially, leading to unprecedented economic growth
and prosperity throughout the world. The elimination of nontariff barriers (NTB’s) and
the reduction of tariffs throughout the world have allowed world trade and wealth to
flow effectively from one country to another guided by the “invisible hand” of economic liberalism. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations, which led to the creation
of a formal World Trade Organization (WTO), was seen by many as evidence pointing
to continued progress toward trade liberalization throughout the world. In contrast to
previous decades, recent developments have stalled further rounds of negotiation at
the WTO, casting doubt on the ability of the WTO to effectively continue the reduction
of trade barriers.
Lack of progress on a global scale has prompted many countries, such as the U.S.,
to turn to bilateral free-trade agreements to achieve their goals of trade liberalization. Indeed, the last several decades have seen a proliferation of bilateral free-trade
agreements. Data from the WTO database lists 221 bilateral free-trade agreements
that are currently in force, the vast majority of which have been signed within the last
fifteen years (WTO.org). Scholarly opinions are mixed about the implications of such
deals on the overall growth of world trade. Some scholars emphasize that bilateral
and regional deals are a viable second-best option to multilateral negotiations and
that such deals often promote successful negotiations at the WTO (Griswold 2003).
Other scholars argue that bilateral/regional deals divert trade, distract from multilateral deals, and often involve countries with asymmetrical bargaining power, thereby
allowing the more powerful industrialized states to manipulate such deals to their
advantage (Bhagwati and Panagariya 2003).
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Overview of the U.S.–Chile FTA

One of the first bilateral agreements that involved the U.S. was the 2003 U.S.–
Chile Free Trade Agreement, which was signed on 6 June 2003 (Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative). The agreement included provisions on a wide variety of topics dealing
with trade in goods and services. The key element of the agreement was the elimination of all tariffs on goods traded between the U.S. and Chile. Eighty-five percent of
the tariffs on industrial and manufactured goods were eliminated immediately, and the
rest were phased out within a period of four years (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement also covered agricultural products such as fresh fruit
and wine. Seventy-five percent of U.S. farm exports to Chile became tariff free within
four years after the agreement was signed, and the rest were to become duty-free
within twelve years of the signing. Ninety-five percent of Chilean exports to the U.S.
also received tariff-free status with the signing of the agreement, with the remaining
5 percent of goods scheduled to become tariff free within a period of twelve years
(Hornbeck 2003: 2).
Other important, and some of the most controversial, aspects of the agreement
are provisions concerning environmental and labor-standards issues. The agreement encourages increased cooperation between the U.S. and Chile on these matters,
including several joint environmental projects on topics ranging from wildlife protection to finding safer alternatives for environmentally hazardous chemicals (Office of
the U.S. trade representative 2002). The agreement also calls for upholding the existing regulations in each country and for abiding by ILO (International Labor Organization) standards. Despite these provisions, labor rights advocates from the Labor
Advisory Committee (LAC) and other labor-rights groups criticized the agreement
for not having sufficient enforcement powers and for being a “big step backwards”
from the labor rights provisions in the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement that was
signed in 2000 (Bolle 2003: 3).
The negotiation of the U.S.–Chile FTA was an extensive process lasting over two
years.1 On 29 November 2000, President George W. Bush notified Congress about his
desires to negotiate an FTA with Chile, and negotiations began on 6 December 2000
(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002). There were fourteen negotiating rounds that culminated in June 2003, when the agreement was signed in Miami,
Florida, by Robert Zoellick, U.S. trade representative, and Chilean Foreign Minister
Soledad Alvear (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 2003). The agreement was
signed by President Bush on 3 September 2003, after passing the House on 24 July
2003 and the Senate on 31 July 2003 (Govtrack.us). The bill entered into effect on 1
January 2004 (Hornbeck 2003). Voting in both the House and the Senate reflected a
partisan divide. In the House, the bill passed with a vote of 270-156 and, of those who
opposed the bill, 128 were Democrats (Govtrack.us). In the Senate, the bill passed
65-32 (with three senators who abstained from voting), and once again twenty-four
of the opposing votes came from Democratic senators (Govtrack.us). 2
60

BERLIN
In 2002, Congress passed the Bi-Partisan Trade Promotion Authority Act effectively granting fast-track authority to President Bush, which allowed him (or his representatives) to directly negotiate trade deals with foreign countries whenever he felt
that a tariff “had a negative effect on the U.S. economy” (Congress 2002). The passing
of the 2002 Trade Act was vital to the completion of the U.S.–Chile FTA because it consolidated negotiating power within the executive branch. Without fast-track authority, it is likely that the U.S.–Chile FTA never would have come to fruition. The 2002
Trade Act also marked an important compromise between Democrats and Republicans on the inclusion of labor and environmental provisions in trade agreements,
which set the stage for many of the political battles involved in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Why a U.S.–Chile FTA?

Economics and politics have always been intricately related, and this statement is
true with regard to the complex global economy that has developed in the twentyfirst century. Although the U.S.–Chile FTA certainly has significant economic implications, the overall economic benefit to the U.S. is merely another drop of water in
the vast ocean of the economy of the United States. The estimated economic benefit of the FTA is $4.2 billion dollars—an impressive figure when measured in absolute terms, but one which equates to only about .04 percent of U.S. economic output
(Office of the U.S. Trade Representative Fact Sheet 2002: 10). Pure economics fail to
explain why the U.S. would invest such a considerable amount of time and effort into
an FTA with Chile, especially in the face of opposition from labor, environmental, and
anti-globalization groups, and the occurrence of other important political developments such as the War on Terror and the Doha round of negotiations at the WTO.
There were other countries far more important to the U.S. in terms of overall trade,3
and in order to fully understand the motivations behind the agreement, one must
examine the political side of the issue.
In Richard Feinberg’s article “The Political Economy of United States’ Free Trade
Arrangements,” Feinberg highlights four political motivations for the U.S. to pursue
FTAs: 1) to open markets for U.S. traders and investors (“asymmetric reciprocity”),
2) to serve as a precedent or catalyst for wider trade agreements, 3) to reward and
support countries for Democratic and market-oriented reform, and 4) to strengthen
strategic partnerships (2003: 1020). The rationale behind the U.S.–Chile FTA is best
understood by examining these political motivations rather than focusing on the economic benefits offered by a bilateral trade agreement between the U.S. and Chile.4
The political reasoning for the U.S.–Chile FTA coincides neatly with the first
three motivations listed by Feinberg. The second motivation, to use FTAs as a template and catalyst for wider trade agreements, is especially applicable in this case. The
U.S.–Chile FTA went hand in hand with the Bush administration’s focus on increasing trade liberalization and forming a hemisphere-wide FTA. The lucrative dream of
a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) was one of Bush’s primary economic
and foreign policy goals, and many viewed the U.S.–Chile FTA as a possible pre61
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cursor to a much larger regional agreement (Becker 2002). In addition, the deal was
struck at the beginning of the Doha round of WTO negotiations, sending a message to
other countries that the U.S. was willing to pursue free trade through bilateral deals
if foreign countries were unwilling to cooperate at a global level.
At the start of Bush’s presidency in 2001, the only U.S. FTA in force (apart from
the NAFTA agreement) was with the economically unimportant but politically salient
Israel. At the end of the year, an FTA with Jordan was signed. Once again, the economic benefits of the treaty were marginal, but the potential national security benefits
were substantial due to Jordan’s strategic location in the Middle East. The U.S.–Chile
FTA follows the pattern of other bilateral trade deals signed by the U.S. by virtue of
the fact that it was signed as much for political reasons as economic ones.
In summary, several factors help explain the rationale behind the FTA with Chile,
namely: President Bush’s desire to establish an FTAA in the Western Hemisphere
while simultaneously applying pressure to advance the Doha round of negotiations
at the WTO, U.S. desire to support liberal democracy and market reform in Latin
America, and, to a lesser extent, U.S. exporters’ interest in gaining access to a growing
Chilean market and consumers’ desires for cheaper Chilean imports. These factors
generated a sufficiently strong consensus in favor of the agreement allowing for its
passage in spite of opposition from interest groups. This paper will attempt to examine each of these factors in greater detail in order to explain the political struggles and
decision-making processes that culminated in the U.S.–Chile FTA.

Political Support for the U.S.–Chile FTA

The roots of the U.S.–Chile bilateral free-trade act run deep. As early as 1991,
U.S. and Chilean officials initiated a discussion concerning a free-trade agreement
between the two countries (Blustein 2002). In 1995, there was a congressional hearing on whether to include Chile in the landmark NAFTA agreement signed between
the U.S., Canada, and Mexico (House Ways and Means Committee). The NAFTA
proposition never really gained steam, and for several years there was little progress
toward a bilateral deal involving the U.S. and Chile. In order to understand the delay
in reaching a free-trade agreement with Chile, one must examine the domestic political struggles between Congress and the executive branch and the importance of presidential trade promotion authority. Important changes in the international economic
environment also increased support for the passage of the U.S. Chile Free Trade Act.
President Bush was not unique or original in his desires to promote trade
between the U.S. and Latin America. It was President Clinton who first had aspirations of forming a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (Bhagwati 1997), but those
aspirations were shattered when Congress refused to grant him fast-track negotiating
authority. Charlene Barshefsky, the U.S. trade representative under Clinton, remarked
that he was “empty-handed” in Latin American trade negotiations without fast-track
authority (Bhagwati 1997). Interestingly, it was congressional Democrats who failed
to support Clinton in his desire for fast-track authority due to their concerns that
62
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Clinton’s proposed trade deals would not provide, “adequate protection for workers
and the environment” (Broder 1998). His efforts were also limited by partisan opposition exacerbated by the fact that Republicans had taken control of both the House and
the Senate in the “Republican Revolution” of 1994. Ultimately, Congress’ refusal to
grant President Clinton trade-promotion authority stymied his efforts to conclude a
free trade agreement with Chile (Feinberg 2003: 21).
The Republican electoral victory in 2000 and the ascension of George W. Bush to
the presidency reopened the door for continued progress toward an FTA with Chile.
Bush was elected on a platform that included the goal of expanding free trade multilaterally as well as regionally, and many of Bush’s first important foreign policy initiatives were aimed at expanding free trade and American political influence. Writer
Paul Blustein highlights the importance of a U.S.–Chile FTA for the Bush administration’s foreign-policy objectives, explaining that despite the small economic benefits
offered by bilateral deals, “the administration is aggressively pursuing them nonetheless as a device for cementing ties with certain nations and as part of an overall
strategy aimed at lowering trade barriers worldwide” (2002).
This strategy was known as “competitive liberalization.” The basic logic behind
the strategy was that by signing bilateral or regional agreements, the U.S. would
put pressure on other countries to engage in trade negotiations and the reduction of
trade barriers if they wanted to remain competitive with exports to the lucrative U.S.
market (Feinberg 2003). This strategy became especially important as negotiations at
the Doha round of WTO talks bogged down over concerns about intellectual property rights and agricultural products. U.S. leaders hoped to increase their bargaining
advantage at the WTO by establishing more limited regional and bilateral agreements,
and the U.S.–Chile FTA was seen as an important stepping-stone in this process.
The overall success of the NAFTA agreement prompted U.S. leaders like Bush
and Zoellick to push toward their dream of forging a Free Trade Agreement of the
Americas (FTAA) that would encompass virtually all of the countries in the Western
Hemisphere (with the obvious exception of Cuba). The economic gains from such an
agreement would be staggering and would provide the U.S. with even closer political
ties (and possibly increased control through economic leverage) with its Latin American neighbors. Similar to Clinton’s aspirations, the creation of an FTAA constituted
one of Bush’s foremost economic goals. In remarks he gave to the Organization of
American States prior to a summit meeting in Quebec, Bush declared:
We must affirm our commitment to complete negotiations on the free trade area
of the Americas by January, 2005. Nothing we do [at the trade meeting] in Quebec will be more important or have a greater long-term impact. It will make our
hemisphere the largest free trade area in the world, encompassing 34 countries
and 800 million people. (Gpo.gov 2001)
To accomplish this important foreign policy objective, Bush appointed Zoellick as the
U.S. Trade representative. Zoellick had been involved in previous trade negotiations
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with Chile during the first Bush administration, and this experience made him an ideal
candidate to work on reaching a trade agreement with Chile (Blustein 2002). After his
appointment, Zoellick immediately began working to hammer out free trade deals
with several countries (including Chile) in hopes that these deals would pave the way
toward an FTAA.
In his first State of the Union address, President Bush declared, “Give me the
strong hand of presidential trade promotion authority . . . and do so quickly” (Sek
2003: 5). On 6 August 2002, his wish was granted by the Trade Act of 2002 after a narrow 215-212 vote in the House and a 64-34 vote in the Senate that took place on 26
July (Sek 2003). Prior votes on provisions to the language of the bill concerning labor
and environmental standards were hotly contested in the House with strong partisan
divisions. Democrats wanted to ensure that labor and environmental concerns would
not be ignored in trade negotiations, and the necessary number of votes could not be
obtained until Republicans agreed to enshrine these provisions in the bill granting
presidential trade-promotion authority. After receiving trade-promotion authority,
negotiations proceeded at an accelerated pace and were concluded on 11 December
2002 (Hornbeck 2003).
The shocking events of 9/11 and the ensuing wars with Iraq and Afghanistan
caused U.S. foreign policy priorities to shift dramatically. In general, there was little Latin American support for the wars, and progress toward an FTAA stalled. The
U.S. hinted at delaying the passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA in order to prod Chilean
officials into supporting the War on Terror (Blustein 2003). Bush and Zoellick were
determined not to lose their chance at forming an American free-trade area. And, “in
an attempt to re-insert itself in regional trade circles, the administration consented
to sign the agreement” (Angrisani 2003: 83). The U.S.–Chile FTA may be viewed as a
preliminary stepping stone toward the greater goal of creating an FTAA, and there
was hope that the agreement would serve as a template for future trade deals and as
a catalyst to spur progress in the Doha round trade talks.
From an economic perspective, the rationale for the agreement comes from the
fact that Chile had (and continues to have) one of the fastest-growing and most highly
developed economies in all of Latin America, and the agreement allowed U.S. exporters greater access to this market. It also provided U.S. consumers with lower prices on
key Chilean exports such as copper, wine, and agricultural products (Hornbeck 2003:
8). Furthermore, there was concern that if an FTA with Chile was not established, U.S.
firms would fail to compete effectively in the Chilean market with firms from Canada,
Mexico, or other Latin American countries—all of whom already had free-trade agreements in place with Chile (Hornbeck 2003: 2). Although, as I have mentioned previously, the economic benefits of the U.S.–Chile FTA were only of secondary importance.
From an ideological perspective, the U.S.–Chile FTA may also be viewed as a statement by the U.S. in support of democracy and economic liberalism. Since the dark days
of the dictator Augusto Pinochet, Chile had made great strides in establishing a gener64
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ally fair and representative Democratic government and in opening herself to world
markets. The Chilean government pursued policies to promote export-led growth and
to protect the property rights and civil liberties of Chilean citizens. Chile also had demonstrated sound macroeconomic management, and many U.S. officials viewed Chile
as “a model for Latin America” and other developing countries throughout the world
(Mares and Aravena 2001: xv preface).5 At a time when the U.S. was actively promoting and defending the ideals of political and economic liberty, the agreement may be
understood as a message to the world that the U.S. was willing to reward developing
countries that made social and economic progress by following the guiding principles
of American political and economic ideology.
FTAs with larger countries such as Argentina or Brazil would have allowed the
U.S. to reap larger economic benefits, but, once again, political motives trumped economic ones. The conservative nature of the Chilean government from both a political
and economic standpoint made it an appealing candidate for a free-trade agreement
especially when contrasted with other Latin American countries such as Argentina,
which had suffered disastrous inflation throughout much of the 1990s. The Chilean
government was also more willing to engage the U.S. in trade talks than other leftleaning governments.6
In his remarks during the signing ceremony of the U.S.–Chile FTA, President Bush
elaborated on the supposed connection between free trade and the spread of democracy, saying, “The growth of economic freedom and ownership in developing countries creates the habits of liberty and creates the pressure for democracy and political
reform” (Georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov 2003). He also stated repeatedly
that the economic benefits associated with free trade, including job creation, cheaper
imports, and increased living standards for citizens of all the nations involved. While
scholars and policy makers may debate whether bilateral FTAs really bring about such
benefits, it is important to note that the Bush administration believed in the benefits of
free trade and pursued policies in accordance with that belief.

Political Opposition to the Agreement

The opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA was championed by various environmentaland labor-rights groups who felt that the agreement failed to impose sufficient environmental and labor standards. One of the most prominent of these groups, and one that
characterizes the sentiments shared by various other individuals and groups in opposition to the U.S.–Chile FTA, was Citizens Trade Campaign, a group originally founded
in opposition to the NAFTA agreement that seeks to establish “social and environmental justice in trade policy” (citizenstrade.org). In general, organizations like Citizens
Trade Campaign oppose FTAs due to their belief that such agreements lead to resource
depletion, competitive deregulation, increased inequality, and the unfair exploitation
of labor.
Environmentalists raised fears that the agreement would force Chile to rely
even more on the exportation of nonrenewable natural resources such as copper and
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other minerals in order to generate wealth. Exports such as copper, fish, and lumber
constitute a very large percentage of Chilean GDP, and those opposed to the agreement argued that it would exacerbate Chile’s dependence on such products, leading
to the eventual depletion of precious natural resources. Labor standards were also
a point of contention, and labor-rights groups voiced concerns that the U.S.–Chile
FTA would increase the already substantial income gap between the richest Chileans
and the average Chilean citizen. Labor unions (primarily the AFL-CIO) also argued
that the agreement should contain stricter provisions regarding labor standards that
would eliminate the possibility of either the U.S. or Chile lowering their standards in
order to gain comparative advantage (Hornbeck 2003: 13).
In reality, concerns about the labor standards provisions of the U.S.–Chile FTA
lacked a strong foundation due to the fact that Chile had a strong record of compliance with International Labor Organization (ILO) standards and had made great
strides in increasing protection and benefits for workers. Many of those opposed to
the agreement recognized this, but their greatest concern was that while the looser
terms of the agreement may have been sufficient for Chile, the agreement would not
work as a template for future deals with other Latin American countries that had a
much shakier track record of upholding adequate labor standards (Hornbeck 2003: 17).
Interest groups and labor unions generally had little influence over the actual
negotiating process. The Trade Act of 2002 had consolidated negotiating power within
the executive branch and specifically within the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Positions within the trade office are given by appointment rather than by direct
election, thus insulating the members of the trade office from the influence of interest
groups. Furthermore, the typical difficulties presented by collective action logic were
mitigated by the 2002 Trade Act. Bush and Zoellick had little reason to worry about a
negative response from several relatively small groups throughout the country given
the fact that they represented the interests of a much broader constituency. Plus, in
Bush’s opinion, the potential economic gains of an FTAA dwarfed environmental or
labor rights concerns, and the U.S.–Chile FTA was a key step in achieving his longterm trade policy goals. After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. public attention
was fixed firmly on the Middle East and the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
negotiation of the U.S.–Chile FTA was merely a side note to the upheavals of the time,
which frustrated any attempts at arousing widespread public opposition to the agreement. Lack of public concern and most importantly the central negotiating power of
the executive branch allowed negotiations to proceed fairly smoothly and without
much interference from the interest groups opposed to the agreement.
After the agreement was signed, pro-environmental and pro-labor groups
turned their efforts toward Congress, yet once again their success was only marginal.
Congressional Republicans overwhelmingly supported Bush and the FTA, as can be
seen by the voting records in both the House and the Senate (Govtrack.us). And by
granting Bush fast-track negotiating authority, many Democrats had already voiced
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their support of free trade expansion in general, and the fiercest political battles had
already been fought. Politicians from both parties were backed on this issue by the
multitude of American Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and export-oriented
firms which formed a key part of the constituencies of most congressman. Fears about
environmental degradation and labor exploitation were assuaged by Chile’s strong
record of progress in both areas and by their commitment to abide by international
standards. All of these factors combined led to a relatively easy passage of the U.S.–
Chile FTA.
The opposition’s greatest success came from their ability to force the U.S. Trade
Office to recognize that the specific provisions of the agreement could not serve as
a framework for future FTA’s with other Latin American countries. Various members of Congress voiced this opinion arguing that the loose terms of the agreement
were likely sufficient for Chile but would be unacceptable for many other developing countries (Congressional Record 2003). Advocates of the agreement were compelled to compromise on this issue in order to receive the necessary votes for the
agreement to pass the House and the Senate.

Evaluating the Effects of the U.S.–Chile FTA

It has now been more than a decade since the U.S.–Chile FTA entered into force,
and by next year, the full effects of all tariff reductions should be felt according to a
study performed by the United States International Trade Commission (Hornberg
2003). An in-depth analysis of the effects of the agreement lies beyond the scope of
this paper, but a brief examination of some of the political and economic repercussions
of the agreement is warranted. From 2003 to 2012, U.S. exports to Chile increased by
a staggering 600 percent, and Chile went from being the thirty-fifth largest export
market for the U.S. to being the nineteenth largest export market (White House Press
Secretary 2013). Chilean exports to the U.S. have also increased by nearly 150 percent over the same time period. The unemployment rate in Chile was slightly below
8.5 percent in January 2004 and is currently hovering around 6 percent (National
Institute of Statistics, Chile). The unemployment rate in the U.S. was 5.7 percent in
January 2004 and was at 5.7 percent in January 2015 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics).
Considering that trade with Chile constitutes a very small portion of the total U.S.
economic output, it is unsurprising that the U.S.–Chile FTA has had little impact on
U.S. employment rates. Judging by the large increases in total trade between the two
countries and the reduction of unemployment in Chile, it appears the agreement has
delivered many of the expected economic benefits without damaging job prospects
for Chilean workers.
The Chilean mining industry, which provides the bulk of Chilean export revenues,
has enjoyed continued strong growth, leading to possibilities for the expansion of mines
in some areas. But expansion creates a risk of additional of environmental degradation.
Concerns have been raised over water depletion in northern Chile, which is home to
some of the world’s largest copper reserves as well as the world’s driest desert—the
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Atacama (Jarroud 2013). It is difficult to draw a direct causal link between the U.S.–Chile
FTA and environmental problems in Chile considering all of Chile’s environmental concerns existed before the agreement was signed. Furthermore, Chile has signed FTAs with
a number of countries, including Canada and the EU, so any environmental problems
due to trade-based economic expansion can only be partially due to the U.S.–Chile FTA.
A study published in 2011 compared Chilean labor laws with those in the
U.S. and found that “Chile currently imposes more labor regulations in some
areas (e.g., termination and severance pay, minimum wages and overtime), while
other aspects of labor law (i.e., unemployment compensation) seem to be similar
to that of the U.S.” (Pattison and Mogab 2011). Chile has also worked to ensure
that its fruit export industry complies with GLOBALG.A.P. certification standards
to ensure fair treatment of labor, but some concerns over the rights of seasonal
workers persist (Bain 2010). Based on these findings, concerns over the potential
exploitation of workers in Chile due to economic pressures appear vastly overexaggerated and insignificant. Overall, evidence suggests that the U.S.–Chile FTA
has had marginal economic effects in the U.S. and produced substantial economic
benefits in Chile. Activists’ concerns about the environment and labor standards
also appear to have been largely avoided.

Conclusion

The U.S.–Chile Bilateral FTA came about primarily due to the Bush administration’s hope that it would serve as a precursor to an FTAA, which would increase the
economic welfare of the country and provide the U.S. enhanced leverage to bargain at
the WTO. In addition, the agreement can be viewed as a move by the U.S. to promote
and reward the spread of democracy and liberal economic principles throughout the
world. The trade promotion authority granted by the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 allowed
officials in the U.S. Trade Office to negotiate much more effectively and severely
restricted the effectiveness of interest groups opposed to the agreement. The dramatic events of 9/11 relegated the U.S.–Chile FTA to the background of U.S. public
consciousness, which further limited interest groups’ ability to mobilize widespread
public opposition to the agreement and enhanced the centralized negotiating power
of President Bush and U.S. Trade Office representatives. Congressional Republicans
strongly supported the agreement due to the potential economic gains it provided,
and many Democrats pledged their support as well after their concerns over labor and
environmental standards were assuaged.
The passing of the U.S.–Chile FTA clearly shows how domestic political developments influence international trade flows and the global economy in general.
Many realist and neoliberal theories of Intellectual Property Enforcement (IPE)
treat states as unitary actors that act out of their own self-interest. While these theories may be helpful for understanding the overall structure of the world economy,
they neglect the influence of domestic political factors on specific policy decisions.
Scholars of international political economy should always take into account these
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domestic factors and how they shape the complex global economy as they analyze
international economic developments.
NOTES

1. Previous talks about a bilateral FTA with Chile or even including Chile in the NAFTA agreement
took place during the first Bush administration and the Clinton administration.

2. Due to Congress’s granting of Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) to Bush in 2002, the U.S.–

Chile was treated as a Congressional Executive Agreement (CEA) rather than as a formal

treaty. CEAs are subject to a straight up and down vote in the Senate rather than a two-third
majority. For more information, see page 78 of the Congressional Research Service report on
treaties and international agreements cited in the references list.

3. At the time the agreement was being negotiated, Chile was the U.S.’s thirty-fourth largest
export destination and thirty-sixth largest import contributor (Hornbeck 2003: 8).

4. Some would argue that preferential FTAs actually have negative economic consequences. For
a further discussion of this topic, see Bhagwati, Jagdish. Termites in the Trading System: How
Preferential Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford University Press, 2008.

5. For a more detailed analysis of Chile’s economic reforms see pages 3–8 of John Hornbeck’s
CRS report for Congress cited in the works cited list.

6. In all honesty, Chile probably did more to initiate trade negotiations than either the Clinton
or the Bush administrations, but this paper focuses on the FTA from the U.S. perspective. See
Feinberg 2003: 1025.
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